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The dilemma of the ever-increasing poor . . . presses
upon us and must inevitably be met within the
framework of our democratic constitutional
government, if our system is to survive as such ....
While today's decision requires only an
administrative, evidentiary hearing, the inevitable
logic of the approach taken will lead to
constitutionally imposed, time-consuming delays of a
full adversary process of administrative and judicial
review. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the United States enacted the Federal Food Stamp Act2 in
order to provide food stamps for individuals in need of basic
sustenance. The concept envisioned was that food stamps would be
distributed by state public assistance agencies entrusted by their
respective legislatures to administer the programs. Individual
applicants for assistance would need to meet certain eligibility
requirements in order to qualify for assistance. Goldberg v. Kelly3
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 272-78 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
2. 7 U.S.C. § 2011-336 (2003). The Federal Food Stamp Act of 1964 provides
benefits for eligible recipients that are exchanged for food at authorized locations.
Recipients of food stamp benefits include persons who are unemployed,
underemployed, elderly, disabled, homeless, members of large households, and
others. See also TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.1 (West 2002).
3. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg is the seminal public assistance case in
American jurisprudence in the twentieth century. Welfare benefits were held to be
a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them resulting in a
necessary pre-termination evidentiary hearing providing the recipient with due
process. For pre-Goldberg rulings, see also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S.
589 (1931); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114, 124-25(1889). Of post-Goldberg interest, see Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 3319 (1976) (holding that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to
termination of Social Security disability payments as contrasted with the overriding
private interest and immediate need of a welfare recipient); Carleson v. Remillard,
406 U.S. 598 (1972) (addressing the requirement that benefits be furnished with
reasonable promptness, absent parent, or military service); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1972) (providing lower welfare benefits for AFDC recipients than
for the aged).
provided the legal avenue through which due process was made
available to recipients who were denied assistance. Needless to say, the
scope and progeny of the Food Stamp Act grew to encompass
numerous, eventually massive public assistance programs. What was
originally intended to be a program designed to meet the nutritional
needs of the indigent and poverty stricken, eligible American
households, increased the demands on a public taxpaying constituency
that eventually demanded reform. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA"). 4
Welfare reform has met legal challenges. The juxtaposition of
court decisions and the fluctuating scope of the national economy
prompts us to examine due process on the front lines of existence in
America. To that goal, this article examines the administrative fair
hearings process in public assistance cases within the Department of
Human Services ("DHS") in Texas. It identifies those federal and state
legal precedents, as well as legislative acts and general agency rules
that have shaped the current status of due process within this agency
over a vast array of programs. The further purpose of this article is to
focus on the ineffectiveness of judicial review in informal public
assistance hearings. The application of this examination should prove
to be of value to state welfare administrative hearings departments.
II. GOLDBERG V. KELLY AND THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT ("PRWORA")
It has been almost thirty three years since Goldberg v. Kelly was
decided. The holding reached in that landmark case embodied the
concept of welfare benefits as a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them, and the procedural due process
4. PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 8 U.S.C). This welfare reform act
was created in 1996 and was codified in sections of title forty-two and eight of the
United States Code. It created time limits for benefits under the Food Stamp and
TANF programs. Additional limitations were placed on eligibility factors of
recipients including some legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, those seeking
asylum, single applicants, non dependant individuals, convicted felons, and others.
See also 7 U.S.C. § 2011-38 (1977); 7 C.F.R. § 251.2 (2003); http://www.finance
project info.org/win.
Fall 2003 Goldberg v. Kelly
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applicable to their termination. The essential requirements in a fair
hearing have evolved to a substantial degree since that time. Welfare
caseloads have declined significantly nationwide, almost by one-half
since the inception of the PRWORA.5 Fair hearings have been at the
forefront of this decline in that appellants have the right to appeal the
determination of ineligibility under the PRWORA. It has been more
than six years since the PRWORA was enacted yet the jury is still out
on the long term effects the PRWORA will have on children,
families, and the workforce. Of concern are the early surveys which
indicate that there continues to exist a disproportionately higher long
term welfare caseload in large cities and counties. 6 For the hearing
officer generally, this translates into continuing challenge within the
framework of fair hearings, post PRWORA, in a wide panoply of
programs not limited to Food Stamps and TANF.7
5. Under the PRWORA, caseloads dropped significantly the first few years
after enactment. Recent trends show a resistance to that earlier reduction according
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, by their report dated,
September, 2002. There are approximately two million families receiving benefits
nationwide. The PRWORA expired on September 30, 2002 but Congress
temporarily extended the reform law in order to allow Congress the opportunity to
reauthorize it.
6. See Margy Waller & Allan Berube, Timing Out: Long Term Welfare
Caseloads in Large Cities and Counties, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
CENTER ON URBAN & METROPOLITAN POLICY (2002).
7. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF"), a cash assistance
program, replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") with the
enactment of welfare reform in 1996. Time limits for receipt of this type of aid
characterized the change with significant emphasis on job search and employment
as requirements for its receipt. States receive "block grants" from the federal
government and have individual discretion on the parameters of the content of the
job requirements for recipients. Emphasis is on "personal responsibility." Clients
who fail to comply with requirements are sanctioned or penalized with reductions
of their amounts of TANF assistance. In 1998, thirty seven states were
administering "full family" sanctions, with five states imposing lifetime sanctions
for repeat rule offenders. Texas is a partial sanction state. See also U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, TANF, IMPROVING
THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF CLIENT SANCTIONS (1999) (citing U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, TANF PROGRAM
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998)).
III. INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS IN WELFARE CASES IN
TEXAS
A. The Beginning of a Welfare State
The Texas Department of Human Services ("DHS") was created
in 1939 by the Texas Legislature, and was known as the State
Department of Public Welfare ("DPW"). s At the time of its creation,
it assumed the duties of three divisions formerly under the
administration of the State Board of Control. They consisted of the
Old Age Assistance Commission, the Texas Relief Commission, and
the Child Welfare Division, which encompassed those state
assistance programs established under the Social Security Act of
1935. 9 In 197710 and then again in 1985, the agency changed its
name with the later date being its present day nomenclature, the
Texas Department of Human Services ("DHS"). The Health and
Human Services Commission ("HHSC") was created in 1991 by the
72 "d Texas Legislature" to oversee and coordinate the activities of
8. There were various agencies that administered public assistance programs in
Texas prior to 1939. However, an amendment to the Texas Constitution by the
Texas Legislature allowed the state to utilize federal money to finance public
assistance programs. 1931: Child Welfare Division established; 1932: First Federal
relief funds were distributed by local chambers of commerce; 1933: Texas Relief
Commission was created; 1935: Texas Constitution amended to authorize payment
of Old Age Assistance grants; 1936:First Old Age Assistance grant was made in
Texas. Aid to the Blind and Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC") were authorized
by amendment to the Texas Constitution.
9. In 1935, the Federal Social Security Act became effective. This Act
provided for assistance programs later established to be state and federally funded.
TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., About DHS, available at
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
10. The Texas Department of Human Services changed its name from
Department of Public Welfare to the Texas Department of Human Resources
("DHR"). Id.
11. This state legislation also transferred the Long-Term Care Regulatory
program for inspection of nursing homes from the Texas Department of Health to
the Department of Human Services and transferred Medicaid purchased health
programs from DHS to TDH. TEx. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., Agency History
1930-1999, available at http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/about/history.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2003). In addition, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory
Services was created and provided assistance in child and adult protective services.
Fall 2003 Goldberg v. Kelly
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eleven health and human services agencies including DHS.
Coordination between agencies resulted from the expansion of health
and human services in the 1960's based on federally motivated
contributions towards the complex delivery system nationwide as
well as in Texas. Twenty separate state agencies with public
assistance focus were in existence in Texas by 1983, charged with the
responsibility of delivering services in Texas in addition to various
local, county and federal agencies, most using disparate methods of
determining eligibility for certification of assistance.
Today, DHS administers various state and federal human services
programs that serve the elderly, persons with disabilities, low income
parent, children, and victims of family violence. 12 One primary
function of DHS today is to determine eligibility and certification of
clients eligible for benefits. Client eligibility carries a program
requirement to be reviewed at specific intervals and at changes in
client status. Also, DHS recovers overpayments to providers and
provides clients with ongoing quality control checks for payment
accuracy. In addition, the agency strives to prevent, detect, and
prosecute fraud and abuse of its various programs through the Office
of Inspector General of DHS.
DHS also provides case management services in long term care
programs as well as regulatory functions of long term care facilities;
including licensing, surveying, and certification of nursing facilities,
intermediate care facilities, adult day care facilities, personal care
A complete agency list is available at
http://www.hhsc. state.tx.us/abouthhsc/HHS-Agencies.html.
12. The mission statement of DHS is "to provide financial, health, and human
services that promote the greatest possible independence and personal
responsibility for all clients" including "fostering of individual choices, dignity,
safety and independence for the elderly, persons with disabilities, and families;
encouraging self-sufficiency while sustaining families and individuals in times of
need; and using public funds in a cost effective and efficient manner." TEX. DEP'T
OF HUMAN SERVS., Mission, Philosophy, and Goals, available at
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/about/mission.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). See
TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., Reference Guide 2003, available at
http://www.bms.dhs.state.tx.us/glance/Reference%20Guide%202003/2003_Refere
nceGuide.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). See generally,
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us.
homes, and home health agencies.' 3  In addition, DHS provides
investigation of allegations of abuse and neglect in these facilities.
Recently, DHSs responsibilities have grown to include the transfer of
the Deaf-Blind Multiple Disabilities Program and the Personal
Attendant Services Program from the Texas Rehabilitation
Commission. 14  Also, regulation of home and community support
services agencies and home health medication aides has been
transferred from the Texas Department of Health together with the
Medically Dependent Children's Program. 15 DHS is charged with
monitoring unlicensed facilities and reporting on their status. 16 Fair
hearings and administrative disqualification hearings in the programs
administered by DHS, are potentially possible at any point in the
eligibility process of programs referenced above. 
17
B. Rules, Regulations, Policy and Procedure
DHS has specific rules regarding the administration of its fair
hearing process. 18 It is informative to look to the definition of what a
fair hearing is within the DHS. The DHS Fair Hearings Handbook
provides that a hearing is "[a]n informal, orderly, and readily
13. TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., Long Term Care-Regulatory, available at
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/programs/ltc/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
14. See TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., What Kind of Help do You Need?,
available at http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/programs/elderly/help.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2003).
15. Id.
16. TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., General FAQs about DHS, available at
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/faqs/general.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
17. TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., TEXAS WORKS HANDBOOK, available at
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/handbooks/texasworks/partb/b900/tw-b930.asp (last
visited Sept. 21, 2003). Please note that in May 2003, the Texas Legislature passed
House Bill 2292 which mandated a fundamental transformation of health and
human services by consolidating the duties and functions of twelve existing state
agencies into a single new health and human services enterprise comprised of the
Health and Human Services Commission and four new departments, of which DHS
is one. This Transition Plan must still undergo public review and comment as well
as submission to the Governor sometime in 2004.
18. See TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., FAIR HEARINGS, FRAUD AND CIVIL
RIGHTS HANDBOOK, available at
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/handbooks/fhfcr/1000/1220.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2003).
Goldberg v. KellyFall 2003
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available proceeding held before an impartial DHS representative.
At the hearing, an appellant or representative, including legal
counsel, may present the case as he wishes to show that any action,
inaction, or agency policy affecting the case should be corrected."' 9
The major objectives in providing DHS fair hearings are to:
* provide each appellant the opportunity to assert his position
regarding assistance from the department in relation to the
law and DHS policies affecting his receiving assistance;
* enable the parties to examine facts so that DHS can make a
just decision;
* contribute to the uniform application of the assistance laws
and policies;
* safeguard appellants from mistaken, negligent, unreasonable,
or arbitrary action or inaction by DHS or contracted agency
staff; and
* call attention to DHS policies which are inequitable, unjust,
or cause undue hardships, so that changes may be made.2 °
Rules prescribing qualifications of a hearing officer within DHS
are specific.
A hearing officer can be any DHS official whom the
commissioner might designate as responsible for
conducting fair hearings . . . [and] making the final
administrative decision [for DHS].21 [A] program
director, supervisor or other designated person may
19. 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 79.1102(4) (West 2003).
20. TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., FAIR HEARINGS, FRAUD AND CIvIL RIGHTS
HANDBOOK § 1220 (2003) [hereinafter TDHS, FHFCR HANDBOOK]. Regulations
concerning fair hearings for public assistance are found in 45 C.F.R., § 205.10;
Regulations concerning fair hearings for medical assistance are found in 42 C.F.R.
§ 431.205. Food Stamp regulations are found in 7 C.F.R., § 273.15.
21. TDHS, FHFCR HANDBOOK § 1220, see also TEX ADMIN CODE 1 tit 1, §
357.9 (West 2003).
Goldber v. Kelly
act as the hearing officer in his region, unless he is
disqualified or unable to act.
22
The right of appeal for an aggrieved party includes the
opportunity for a hearing before a DHS hearing officer.
2 3
A. Any applicant or recipient requesting a hearing for any of the
following reasons has the right to appeal:
i. The client makes a claim for assistance or services but
the request is denied, modified, or not acted upon with
reasonable promptness;
ii. DHS takes action that results in suspension, reduction,
discontinuance, or termination of assistance or
services;
iii. The client disagrees with the manner or form in which
DHS makes payments to him, including restricted or
protective payments, even though no federal financial
participation is claimed; or
iv. The client is dissatisfied with conditions he must meet
to receive payments, including work requirements.
24
22. Tit. 40, § 79.1102(5). Most hearing officers in DHS are non-attorney
hearings specialists who bring highly tenured and extensive program backgrounds
into their careers as hearing officers. Hearing Officers are immediately supervised
by managers, who also participate in adjudication of decisions and who oversee
procedural and timeliness requirements as well as personnel issues. Those
managers in turn are supervised by an Administrative Judge and Attorney at Law,
who is certified as an Administrative Law Judge.
23. Tit. 40, § 79.1102(8). On August 1, 1999, DHS adopted the Uniform Fair
Hearing Rules into existing Fair Hearing Rules. TDHS, FHFCR HANDBOOK §
1133.
24. Tit. 40, § 79.1102(8)(A).
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Additional rights of appeal apply to the following: 25
* nursing facility discharge,
* preadmission screening and annual resident review
(PASARR), or
* protected resource amount in Medicaid eligibility cases.26
There is no right of appeal in the following situations:
B. If DHS terminates a provider's contract or the provider stops
providing services for some other reason, the individual
recipient may not appeal unless his eligibility is otherwise
affected."
C. "[A right of appeal] is not provided in cases... [where] ...
the sole issue is an across-the-board reduction of services or
assistance to a class of recipients. 17a
IV. THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL REVIEW 1N TEXAS WELFARE
HEARINGS
In Texas there is no statutory law which allows an aggrieved
party judicial review of a DHS administrative hearing. A DHS
Hearing Officer, after hearing evidence, makes findings of fact and
25. DHS rule and statutory authority stipulate a public assistance recipient's
right to a fair hearing. See 1 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 357.1 (West 2003); TDHS,
FHFCR HANDBOOK § 1220. "The standards for fair hearings apply to all DHS
programs except as otherwise provided by statute or departmental rules, including
clients served through agencies under contract with DHS." TDHS, FHFCR
HANDBOOK §1310, supra note 20.
26. 1 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 357.1(a) (West 2003). A client may appeal a DHS
hearing officer's final administrative decision and request an administrative review.
DHS administrative reviews are not hearings de novo. An agency attorney, or
other qualified individual, reviews the paper case record and recordings made of
the fair hearing for the basic tenets of due process. Wide discretion is afforded the
hearing officer in his final decision. Except in the instance of denial of due process
as evidenced from the record, or a glaring procedural mistake by the original
hearing officer, final decisions in DHS will remain undisturbed. See also tit. 40,
§79.1105.
conclusions of law and issues a final decision. There is no judicial
review outside of an agency administrative review that is provided
for an appellant.27 Generally, in order for judicial review to apply,
there must be a statute authorizing judicial review, or the action
complained of must either (1) violate constitutional procedural due
process, or (2) the states' immunity from suit is waived by the
constitution. 28 Basic doctrines existing in Texas jurisprudence also
further restrict the initiation of formal judicial review in the DHS fair
hearings process.29
A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars a suit for judicial review
against a state under two principles. First, a state must have given its
permission to be sued.30 That permission must be expressly given.
31
Likewise, a suit against an agency of a state is considered to be a suit
against the state. 32 Second, sovereign immunity is the concept that a
state has immunity from liability even though a state may have
consented to being sued.33 The doctrine of sovereign immunity
removes judicial review from the immediate purview of DHS
Hearing Officer final decisions. However, it begs the question of
subject matter jurisdiction by a state district trial court as a viable
alternative.
27. tit. 40, § 79.1102(8)(B), (C).
28. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Tex. High-Speed Rail Auth., 867 S.W.2d 154,
157 (Tex. App. 1993); City of Port Arthur v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 13 S.W.3d 841,
845 (Tex. App. 2000).
29. These doctrines include sovereign immunity, subject matter jurisdiction,
primary jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, and exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
30. Dillard v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. App. 1991);
Hosner v. De Young, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847).
31. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex.
1970).
32. Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976).
33. Dillard, 806 S.W. 2d at 592.
Fall 2003 Goldberp- v. Kelly
450 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction by a Trial Court
What burden does a plaintiff or aggrieved party have in
affirmatively showing that a trial court would have subject matter
jurisdiction in a governmental agency matter absent the availability
of judicial review? Subject matter jurisdiction by a trial court is a
question of law and is reviewed de novo.34 The trial court would
look solely to the allegations in the petition and the court of appeals
would necessarily take the allegations in the petition as true and
construe them in the light most favorable to the party pleading
them.35 A plaintiff could rely on the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") as a statutory basis for a suit in a Texas district court,
however, numerous opinions hold that the APA procedural provision
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on a district court in a
petition for judicial review unless that review is authorized under the
agency's enabling legislation or other statutory provision.36 The
absence of a statute providing for judicial review, together with the
general lack of subject matter jurisdiction by a trial court, further
confirms that no judicial review of a DHS Hearing Officer's final
decision is available in a trial court unless there exists an issue of
constitutional deprivation of due process.
C. Primary Jurisdiction, Exclusive Jurisdiction, and Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
The doctrines of primary jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, and
exhaustion of administrative remedies generally arise in cases where
jurisdictional issues arise between an administrative agency and a
court. Texas courts had, until recently, historically applied the
doctrines in an inconsistent manner. Although the doctrines are
34. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 48 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex. App.
1999), rev'd on other grounds, 51 S.W.3d 583, 589 (Tex. 2001); Mayhew v.
Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).
35. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.
1993); Miller, 48 S.W.3d at 204.
36. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (Vernon 2000); Tex. Dep't of
Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. App. 1997);
S.C. San Antonio, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Human Servs., 891 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex.
App. 1995).
distinct, they have often been applied as if they were interchangeable
in concept. The doctrines are significantly different, albeit sharing
issues of similarity in their use. For purposes of examination of
judicial review of an agency action, it is essential to look to the scope
and purpose of each doctrine.
1. Primary Jurisdiction
Primary jurisdiction is jurisdiction granted by a judicially created
doctrine to an administrative agency in order to decide certain
controversies initially before relief is sought in the courts. Primary
jurisdiction also means that a court may dismiss or stay an action
pending a resolution of all or some portion of the case by an
administrative agency. By its very name, primary jurisdiction
connotes that jurisdiction may be appropriate in some other court or
forum than the one in which the question is being considered.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction a matter which is
rendered by statute to an agency for initial action must be determined
by that administrative agency before the matter may be reviewed by a
court. The doctrine applies when resolution of issues are placed
within the special competence of an administrative body. 37  The
doctrine's importance is most relevant when certain types of
administrative decisions are desirable or when there is a need for the
specialized knowledge of an agency. 38 The purpose of the doctrine is
37. United States v. W. Pac. R.R, 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
38. Shell Pipeline Corp. v. Coastal States Trading, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 837, 842
(Tex. App. 1990). In my opinion, formal judicial review in Texas would be
inordinately burdensome on the state both financially and in terms of the sheer
volume of informal hearings held by DHS each year. In addition, the burden on
elected district court judges to conduct reviews as bench trials would be substantial.
Judicial desk reviews would also serve as inadequate vehicles for hearings de novo,
as they would not meet the due process standard outlined in Goldberg v. Kelly and
its progeny. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Texas Government Code Sections
2001.171 - 2001.174 specifically addresses this point, stating in § 2001.174.
Review Under Substantial Evidence Rule or Undefined Scope of Review:
If the law authorizes review of a decision in a contested case
under the substantial evidence rule or if the law does not define
the scope of judicial review, a court may not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of
the evidence on questions committed to agency discretion but: (1)
may affirm the agency decision in whole or in part; and (2) shall
Fall 2003 Goldberg v. Kelly
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"to assure that the administrative agency will not be bypassed on
what is especially committed to it [by the legislature]. 39
2. Exclusive Jurisdiction
The Texas Supreme Court recently addressed a method for
determining whether an agency had "exclusive jurisdiction" over a
matter as opposed to primary jurisdiction. 40  They found that
exclusive jurisdiction is a jurisdictional doctrine, as opposed to
primary jurisdiction, which is a doctrine given to the prudence or
reasonability of the jurisdiction as deemed through statute or judicial
interpretation. Primary jurisdiction applies when both a court and an
agency may have concurrent authority based on subject matter to
reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision; (B) in
excess of the agency's statutory authority; (C) made through
unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) not
reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the
reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or (F)
arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174 (2003) (emphasis added).
39. Foree v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. 1968).
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
wherein the Supreme Court identified a category of interpretive choices
distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference, recognizing that
Congress engages not only in express, but also in implicit, delegation of specific
interpretive authority. "A very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron
treatment is express congressional authorizations to engage in the rulemaking or
adjudication process that produces the regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed. Thus, the overwhelming number of cases applying Chevron deference
have reviewed the fruits of notice and comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication." United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001). See also
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). The Supreme Court
has also found reason for Chevron deference even when no administrative
formality was required as in Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995). Application of Chevron is not barred by lack of formal
process. See also Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex .1994); State v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1994); Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845
S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1993).
40. Cash Am. Int'l, Inc., v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. 2000).
make initial determinations in a dispute, although ultimately,
jurisdiction would be appropriate in the primary forum.
Exclusive jurisdiction is an issue of statute and statutory
interpretation as to which forum is the correct jurisdiction for
resolution of the matter. For example, a court could determine that
an agency did not have exclusive jurisdiction but the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction would require the trial court to abate a
proceeding until the final administrative decision was reached. In the
alternative, if the legislature mandates that a party exhaust
administrative remedies, that mandate constitutes exclusive original
jurisdiction in that administrative agency.
3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is as follows: "a doctrine of
civil and criminal procedure: a remedy cannot be sought in another
forum (as a federal district court) until the remedies or claims have
been exhausted in the forum having original jurisdiction (as a state
court, tribal court, or administrative agency)." The dictionary also
notes that
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies was first
developed by judges in case law based on comity. It
is used primarily in administrative law cases and
federal habeas corpus cases, and it is now
incorporated in the federal habeas corpus statute
(section 2254 of title 28 of the U.S. Code). It may
also be applied when an administrative agency has
original jurisdiction over a claim. It is used in
proceedings in tribal courts.
4 1
Texas cases have held that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a jurisdictional doctrine which provides that parties must
first exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial
41. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 178 (ed. 1996).
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review or filing a suit.42 Purposes of the doctrine of administrative
remedies include prevention of "premature interruption of an
administrative agency's duty of applying the regulatory statute to the
facts of the case" in which the agency may hold the expertise,
experience, and administrative discretion from which a court may be
incompetent to handle.43  Also, its purpose necessarily includes
avoidance of the needless expenditure of district court judicial time
and resources in the resolution of disputes that could be resolved
within a continuing or ongoing administrative process. The doctrine
allows an administrative agency the opportunity to rectify its own
errors and therefore assure respect for the administrative process as
well as discourage the disregard of that process. 44
Exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies have focused on challenges to administrative agency action
based on constitutional grounds such as the denial of due process and
civil rights violations.45 However, despite constitutional challenges,
actions by administrative agencies in Texas have been allowed
notwithstanding the absence of any statutory right to appeal.46
V. CONCLUSION
When PRWORA became law on August 22, 1996, our nation's
welfare system was transformed into one where work is required in
exchange for public assistance within time limits. 47 The Food Stamp
42. See City of Sherman v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex.
1983); Firefighters & Police Officers' Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Herrera, 981 S.W.2d
728, 732 (Tex. App. 1998),
43. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pedemales Elec. Coop., Inc., 678 S.W.2d 214, 220
n.3 (Tex. App. 1984).
44. Id.
45. Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d
88, 91 (Tex. 1992); Jones v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 872 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.
App. 1994).
46. Yahama Motor Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Div., 830 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex.
App. 1993).
47. On February 13, 2003, the U.S. House of Representatives approved
changes to PRWORA of 1996. These changes would require a larger percentage of
a state's aid recipients to take jobs and work longer hours. Recipients would be
required to work or be involved in scheduled activities such as training. The
requirement would split necessary hours between on the job hours and school, job
23-2
and TANF programs stand at the forefront of the reform. Work
activities under TANF are defined within this law as are time limits
and state maintenance of effort requirements referred to as "MOE.,
48
Fair hearings provide the vehicle for public assistance recipients to
be heard through the often confusing and challenging eligibility
requirements and certification process for public assistance. This
becomes especially crucial in light of the absence of formal judicial
review in Texas.
A hearing officer's impact on any of these areas has substantial
importance when viewed in the perspective of PRWORA and its
changing requirements. 49 A hearing officer, remaining faithful to the
tenets promulgated under Goldberg v. Kelly and its progeny is
possible without the statutorily created process of judicial review.
The safeguards of impartial vigilance and observance of due process
by trained hearing officers in fair hearings, administrative reviews,
and administrative disqualification hearings in DHS cannot be
underestimated, nor can it be duplicated through a formal process of
judicial review. The future of DHS public assistance fair hearings
without formal judicial review ultimately remains to be seen as
training, drug rehabilitation, parenting classes or other instruction. It remains to be
seen whether final passage of this change will become law.
48. States must spend a certain minimum amount of their own money to help
eligible families under the TANF block grant program in a manner consistent with
the purposes of the TANF program. States are rewarded for high performance and
the reduction of out of wedlock births. One billion dollars is available through
fiscal year 2003 to states for achieving program goals. Separate annual
appropriations or bonuses will be awarded to the five states that can show the
greatest success rates in reducing out of wedlock birth rates while also reducing
abortion rates.
49. The United States Department of Health and Human Services may currently
limit a state's block grant under TANF if it fails to meet satisfactory work
requirements by its recipients, comply with five year limits on assistance, meet the
state's basic maintenance of effort requirements, meet a state's contingency fund MOE
requirement, reduce recipient grants for refusing to participate in work activities
without good case, maintain assistance when a single custodial parent with a child
under six cannot obtain child care, submit required data reports, comply with paternity
establishment and child support enforcement requirements, participate in the Income
and Eligibility Verification System, repay a federal loan on time, use funds
appropriately, and replace federal penalty reductions with additional state funds.
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PRWORA requirements become increasingly focused on the
personal responsibility of the recipient.
